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Explicating different ways of consensus making at the interface between science and 
society 
In our society, there are these moments in which establishing a scientific consensus seems 
imperative to solve urgent problems, for instance, as concerns climate change; achieving 
consensus on the causes and extent of global warming would facilitate policymaking and, 
moreover, send a convincing signal that doing nothing will have dire consequences. On the 
other hand, philosophers studying plurality and heterodoxy in science have raised questions 
concerning the ideal of the scientific consensus and the pernicious effects the consecration 
of scientific consensus might have.  
 
Several philosophers of science have developed interesting accounts on how to deal with 
this tension between plurality and consensus; how scientific plurality, dissent, and 
consensus-making can go hand in hand: and, in relation hereto, how consensus conferences 
manage to deal with the tension between plurality and consensus. In what follows, we want 
to analyse some of these accounts about how science goes or should go from scientific 
plurality to scientific consensus, introducing an important distinction between consensus-
making among scientists – establishing an academic consensus – on the one hand and 
consensus-making at the interface between science and society – establishing an interface 
consensus – on the other hand. 
 
This analytical distinction will help us (a) compare the differences among philosophers in 
understanding consensus-making, (b) develop our social-procedural account of scientific 
consensus (analogous with social accounts of objectivity) paying attention to meta-
consensus, and (c) spell out how to modify the public understanding of science and the 
public use of the ideal of consensus. 
 
1. Aspects of scientific consensus: the intra-scientific consensus and the science-society 
interface. 
 
If we aim to elaborate on the tension between consensus and plurality mentioned above, we 
need first establish what aspects of scientific consensus we would like to address here. We 
draw a distinction between a ‘technical, academic consensus’ and an ‘interface consensus’1. 
The former points at a consensus being established among scientists or experts in a certain 
field related to a certain topic. The latter relates to a consensus being established at the 
border between science and society, typically including a wider range of actors apart from 
scientists (i.e. laypeople, interactional experts, government representatives, etc.). The most 
intuitive way to grapple this distinction is by distinguishing two problems or two moments of 
decision-making that should be analytically separated, i.e. the actual move from plurality to 
consensus among scientists or experts on the one hand and the moment of dissemination 
and justification towards or within society on the other hand.  
                                                          
1
 We grant at once that talking about consensus can at the same time apply to academic as well as interface 
consensus. The distinction is meant to be non-exclusive. What we seek to elaborate are ideal types of 
consensus that can be used to classify or evaluate the plethora of non-ideal or mixed cases that dominate the 
research practice. These moments might de facto coincide, but might be distinguishable, e.g., as concerns the 
way uncertainties are weighted. 
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Another way to comprehend the distinction is by describing it in terms of the relation 
between its actors and/or the conditions that need to be fulfilled beforehand. The 
relationship at play within academic consensus is one between experts. In the academic 
world, every scientist/academic is regarded to be an (equal) peer and everyone serves as an 
authority within his or her field. These people are generally regarded to be on the cutting 
edge of research and are expected to be among the first to notice changes occurring within 
their field of expertise. The relationship at play within the interface consensus is one 
between expert and layman, grasping the interface between science and society. This type 
entails a relation between expert and layman grounded on authority, trust, and mutual 
respect, where the actors are not regarded to be on equal footing. The difference in 
interaction is important to bear in mind when we want to have a look at what’s at stake in 
each of them. This brings us to our second point, namely the conditions that need to be 
fulfilled beforehand. As for academic consensus, we could argue that the community should 
enable critical interaction among academic experts and have significant evidence available 
on the basis of which a conclusion can be formulated. As for interface consensus, some form 
of academic consensus or a first attempt to establish consensus is required to start up the 
interface process. 
 
A helpful example to illustrate how this distinction might be used are consensus 
conferences. To demonstrate this, we briefly sketch the workings and goals of the National 
Institute of Health Consensus Conferences (NIH): The NIH consensus development program 
constructs major conferences that aim to produce evidence-based consensus statements 
addressing controversial issues in medicine important to health care providers, patients, and 
the general public. The conferences aspire to provide an independent look at the issues 
through an unbiased panel. These conferences are run on a type of ‘court model’, in which 
the panel members serve as a jury. They are supposed to have no financial or career 
interests related to the topic and they are highly regarded in their own fields, but are in no 
way closely aligned with the subject under scrutiny. 
 
Due to the stress on providing an evidence-based consensus, the NIH itself differentiates 
between Consensus Development Conferences and State-of-the-Science Conferences. 
Consensus Development Conferences are typically undertaken when there is a solid body of 
high-quality evidence, such as randomized trials and well-designed observational studies. 
State-of-the-Science Conferences are generally utilized in cases where the evidence base is 
weaker. In both cases the statement is a report evaluating scientific information on a given 
biomedical or public health intervention with the purpose of resolving a particular 
controversial issue in clinical practice. Each report handles a series of five to six questions 
concerning efficacy, risk, clinical applications, and directions for future research. As sketched 
out in the NIH guidelines, these conferences have set two goals for themselves: On the one 
hand, they aspire to bring about rational consensus on controversial health topics, and, on 
the other hand, they intend to spread the medical information across to the broader public. 
We could say that the NIH conferences carry the task of contributing both to ‘academic 
consensus’ as to ‘interface consensus’, to the former by establishing a consensus within the 
scientific community and to the latter by providing and transmitting this established 
scientific consensus to the larger community (NIH, website).  
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Obviously, as thinking the example through shows, there might be an overlap between both 
moments and there might be causal influences in both directions. In the following sections, 
we will show how our analytical distinction helps in explicating different understandings of 
the structure and functions of consensus-making in the philosophical literature. First, in 
section 2, it will made clear how the example of the NIH consensus conferences already 
captures differences among philosophers in understanding consensus making. 
 
2. Consensus-making conferences: Miriam Solomon on the two moments of consensus-
making. 
 
Miriam Solomon (2007) argues that the National Institute of Health consensus development 
conferences do not bring about rational consensus on controversial health topics. Solomon 
insists that a consensus usually exists beforehand, at least among the researchers, as 
opposed to what the NIH claims to be the case. According to her, these conferences can only 
serve a (subsidiary) goal of spreading the information across to a more general public. 
 
Put bluntly, although Solomon will agree that a consensus conference can contribute to 
interface consensus, she will not agree that consensus conferences contribute to academic 
consensus, because of the latter consensus already existed before the conference started. 
According to her, consensus conferences miss the intended window of epistemic 
opportunity: they typically take place after the experts have reached consensus.2  
 
In her understanding of the role of consensus conferences, Solomon (implicitly) distinguishes 
between the two moments identified above. She claims that the actual (NIH) consensus 
conferences should be seen as a moment of disseminating knowledge, justifying a clinical 
practice, … not as a place for doing science and establishing an intra-scientific consensus, 
that already happened beforehand.  The consensus conference is then a ritual, a 
choreographic epistemic performance, creating authoritative knowledge; it is the moment of 
the interface consensus addressing the public intended. In her own words, consensus 
conferences can be merely a “[…] rhetorically efficacious way to get the word out, to 
interested intermediaries such as professional groups, pharmaceutical companies and health 
insurance companies who will then adapt the statements for their own particular purposes” 
(Solomon, 2007: 175). 
 
Her account, however, is left with a couple of open problems. First, the way in which 
Solomon argues for such a quite substantial claim raises questions. If one gazes upon the 
history of NIH consensus conferences one can see that the NIH already organized over 157 
conferences. Solomon discusses two of them in further detail, which are supposed to serve 
as central examples to clarify what NIH consensus conferences actually entail. However, 
when push comes to shove, she omits to say why these two are typical examples. So the 
question remains whether they really are as typical as she supposes them to be and on what 
grounds she (can) make(s) this assumption. Moreover she does not address how exactly the 
establishment of the intra-scientific, academic consensus came to be; Does establishing an 
                                                          
2
 In previous work, we analyzed her claim and found it to be wanting, mainly because the examples she gives in 
favor of her account do not suffice (cf. [AUTHOR], 2012). 
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academic consensus go further than published studies pointing in the same direction? And if 
the consensus conference is merely a ritual, if the only epistemic surplus/value is that it 
authorizes knowledge, then why was there a different outcome in NIH consensus conference 
1977 and the Danish consensus conference 1983 (both on breast cancer screening)?3 Do we 
have the same academic consensus (preceding consensus conferences) in both cases and a 
different interface consensus (as a result of the consensus conferences) because of the 
difference in publics intended?4 
 
We will return to this matter below. In this section, we presented the role scientific 
consensus plays in consensus conferences and the way in which consensus is established, 
whereby two moments of consensus-making can be distinguished. According to Solomon, 
consensus conferences serve to the second one, i.e. the elaboration of an interface 
consensus, while the first one, the making of the academic consensus, happens beforehand 
(cf. Solomon 2007: 173, “the rational basis for that consensus is made clear by AHRQ formal 
assessment of that evidence” (AHRQ is the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality). 
 
 
3. Experts and consensus-making: John Beatty on the two moments. 
 
Whereas Solomon’s work teaches us a lot on the “interface moment”, John Beatty’s focus is 
in the first place on the scientific experts establishing a consensus among themselves, the 
academic consensus. Obviously, the possible societal impact and consequences are taken 
into account – leading to some kind of self-censorship (cf. Beatty, 2006) – but there is no 
consideration of an explicit public moment, during which an interface consensus would be 
established. 
 
In his earlier work on experts (2006), Beatty already captures part of the tension between 
consensus making on the one hand and intrinsic value of plurality on the other hand. 
Through a case study of the maximal admittable dose of radiation for humans, he utters that 
craving consensus might widen the gap between expert and novice in two distinctive ways. 
First, what he calls simplification, entails that scientists instead of simply telling us what they 
know, they might tell us simply. In this manner, a lot of crucial information gets lost along 
the way. Second, what he identifies as the intentional withholding of information, means 
that scientists often agree amongst one another as to retain information from the public or 
silence discussions, which results in a distorted view of consensus amongst the public and 
nourishes the ill-conceived expectations they might have. Both pitfalls find their reasoning 
on either paternalistic or protective grounds, as Beatty elaborates. The former meaning that 
experts state that it might actually be in the public’s advantage if they speak with one voice 
                                                          
3
 The first Danish medical consensus conference was held in 1983, on the topic of early detection of breast 
cancer. It did not recommend general mammographic screening, even for women over 50 years of age, thus 
coming to a different conclusion from the first NIH Consensus conference held in 1977 (see Jorgensen 1990). 
“The role that consensus conferences can play in making policy explains why different countries hold consensus 
conferences on the same topics. For example, recommendations for mammograms to screen for breast cancer 
may be different in countries with different resources or different values. For instance, in the UK, mammograms 
are not routinely offered to elderly women because they are not cost effective at that age; in the USA cost 
effectiveness is not valued so highly.” (Solomon, 2011: 248) 
4
  
5 
 
rather than with many, whereas the latter hints at the fact that experts, in this manner, 
could in fact guarantee that their status remains intact and can prohibit others from gaining 
the authority and trust to do their work. 
 
Building on these striking insights on how scientific consensus is actually achieved, Beatty 
(together with Alfred Moore) works out an account of consensus formation that is partly 
procedural and partly substantive5, i.e. a notion of deliberative acceptance. In their paper 
‘Should we aim for consensus?’ (2010), they start from an account of consensus-making set 
forth by Margaret Gilbert (1987). Gilbert captures a notion, of what she calls, joint 
acceptance: “A group jointly accepts p if and only if the individual members have openly 
agreed to let p stand as the position of the group” (Gilbert, 1987: 194). Beatty and Moore 
emphasize two characteristics of this account of consensus. First, consensus understood in 
this sense tackles the notion on a rather different level: there is no talk of consensus on a 
certain proposition p, but consensus to let p stand as the position of the group. On p itself 
there could be considerable disagreement. Let us clarify this with a simple example. Suppose 
your faculty board wants to hire a new full-time professor in ethics, and after discussion and 
voting they opt to go with candidate A. You, however, preferred candidate B, based on the 
previous experiences she acquired and the impression she gave during the interviews. 
Candidate A however is put forth as the department’s choice. Now, in the same manner you 
can disagree as an expert on p, but yet again acknowledge the consensus recommending p 
(Beatty & Moore, 2010: 206). Moreover, in Gilbert’s terms, one is thought not to publicly 
disagree with the group opinion, of course one is not expected to lie, but any dissenting 
views should be rather carefully expressed (Beatty & Moore, 2010: 207). Second, according 
to Beatty and Moore, defining consensus as such renders the notion meaningless. One can 
endorse a rather weakly defined notion as the consensus opinion, on which everyone 
agrees, but in such a case it is nothing more than an empty shell (Beatty & Moore, 2010: 
208).6 
 
Beatty and Moore, develop their own notion, partly inspired by Gilbert, of consensus 
formation, i.e. deliberative acceptance: “A group deliberatively accepts p if and only if the 
individual members, based on the quality of their deliberation, have openly agreed to let p 
                                                          
5
 In section 4 we clarify in detail what they mean by both parts of the definition. 
6
 An historical example arguing in favor of this remark is the consensus report (and table) published by Peter 
Mitchell to support his chemiosmosis hypothesis over the dominant chemical or direct-interaction coupling 
theory, to explain how and why ions move from an area of high concentration to an area of low concentration. 
Mitchell, however, presented a distorted view of consensus in the scientific discipline in 3 respects: (1) He does 
not identify all the expert members dealing with this topic, as this better fits his view of consensus on his 
hypothesis growing steadily over the years. (2) He ascribed some of the experts a wrong position. For example, 
the table mentioned experts being already halfly convinced that his route was the way to go, whereas it turned 
out they were actually convinced of his approach being half right. (3) He omits to specify the full extent of the 
cognitive content of consensus and forgets to show how it coincides with the views of the scientists. The 
consensus view he put forward seemed to be fairly evident, whereas upon careful examination it turned out that 
every scientist fills in the definition of chemiosmosis rather different. The consensus approach was thus based on 
a basic version of chemiosmosis, however, “the scientific content of this basic version was minimal; so much so 
that it could be and frequently was endorsed by those who described themselves and were described by others as 
strongly opposed to chemiosmosis as well as by those who claimed to be fervent supporters of the theory” 
(Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984: 130). With Gilbert’s understanding of consensus as joint acceptance, you might obtain 
situations like the Abilene paradox, where no one wants to "rock the boat", and, eventually, the consensus 
position that is accepted is counter to the position of every individual. 
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stand as the position of the group” (Beatty & Moore, 2010: 209). As opposed to joint 
acceptance, this view allows for an explicit moment where dissenting opinions could be 
heard and noticed through deliberation (expanded with a system of voting when necessary). 
Beatty and Moore are convinced that their approach surpasses the difficulties set forth for 
Gilbert’s account: “Deemphasizing consensus on substantive issues (though not entirely), 
and stressing consensus on deliberative quality would not only take away the temptation to 
hide a persistent minority position, but would instead provide a good use for it. What better 
way to inspire confidence in a deliberative outcome than to show that 1) the position in 
question had been tested against a worthy alternative; 2) the minority felt that they had 
been heard, that they had been treated as deliberative equals; and 3) having been heard, 
even the minority agreed to let the position in question stand as the group’s” (Beatty & 
Moore, 2010: 209). However, we think their account faces a couple of open problems. First, 
‘let the position stand’ is too passive to be able to capture the interaction between opinions 
and dissenting views. This phrasing omits the fact that in scientific and interface discussions 
there are not only persistent minority positions (sometimes there even might not be any 
position that convinces more than half of the participants), but in most occasions continually 
present minorities who are not that eager to just give in. This relates to our second 
objection, i.e. the position of the minority. Deliberative acceptance in a sense is aiming too 
high. According to this view, there will be a time when the minority has to admit that they 
were heard and that some kind of epistemic justice has occurred, that they were found to be 
unconvincing, and that they should correspondingly endorse the consensus position of the 
group. Although Beatty and Moore spell out this objection themselves, they find it 
unconvincing to aim lower (Beatty & Moore, 2010: 209). Finally, moving from an academic 
consensus to an interface consensus, opens up the question what the responsibilities of the 
scientific expert are and what the responsibilities of society or policy-makers are, i.e. those 
that set-up expert committees and decide upon their functioning. As sketched out above, 
Beatty and Moore’s account rather functions on the level of academic consensus. Interesting 
to see, however, would be how their account tackles the problems raised above. 
 
Summarizing, Beatty & Moore focus on the formation of the academic consensus, keeping 
an eye on how the consensus could be sold to the public by the experts, and taking into 
account the expectations of the public (cf. section 6), but there is no consideration of an 
explicit public moment, during which an interface consensus would be established. Neither is 
the epistemic contribution of interactions between the academic and the interface moment 
explored (an interaction in which minority positions might play an important role, cf. below). 
  
 
4. Consensus-making and the meta-consensus I: a social-procedural account of scientific 
consensus. 
 
In developing their account of consensus, Beatty & Moore rely on democratic theory, just 
like we have done before (see [AUTHOR], 2009). We think this points at an important 
characteristic of consensus-making, in solving the tension between plurality and consensus, 
which is not always made explicit in accounts of consensus as knowledge-based: in both 
moments, there is a meta-consensus or a meta-agreement in play. Therefore, instead of 
focusing on consensus on the simple level, that is, as the result of alternative 
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theories/models tested against one another eventually – thought to be – leading to some 
consensus outcome, we could learn a lot by shifting to the analysis of the meta-consensus 
that stipulates the procedure to be followed. Understandings of consensus-making differ in 
how much weight they place on procedures relative to substantive considerations about the 
quality or characteristics of the outcomes of these processes. Let us elaborate this 
distinction further: 
 
(a) Focusing on outcome, the substantive approach to consensus-making: Researchers agree 
on what they agree (in its ideal form mostly understood as a unanimity in which every 
participant comes to hold the same position for the same reasons) and the outcome satisfies 
certain conditions to assure that the consensus is right/correct and/or knowledge-based. 
Thus, there is a defined desirable outcome or decision (the outcome has to be right, living up 
to procedure-independent qualities), and in that sense, an implicit presumption of what a 
collective process or procedure has to generate qua collective decision; the existence of a 
consensus is presupposed. In this account, complete unanimity is not required, but only that 
if dissent exists, it is marginalized and suppressed. (Miller, 2013) 
 
(b) Focusing on the procedure, the procedural approach to consensus: Researchers might 
agree on the procedure through which to aim for a collective decision/consensus. Call it a 
form of meta-agreement or meta-consensus, without specifying requirements on the 
substance, on the outcome, that this procedure eventually should produce. Here, there are 
no procedure-independent criteria to assess the quality of the correct outcome; it is the 
procedure itself that matters and that has to satisfy certain normative criteria. An outcome 
is legitimate if the collective decision-making procedure itself satisfies certain conditions and 
these conditions (the appropriateness of the procedures) might be satisfied in degrees (cf. 
infra) (Longino, 2002, chapter 6).  
 
(c) Focusing partly on procedure and partly on outcome: Both the procedures and the 
outcome should be correct. Beatty & Moore’s account presented in section 3 is a nice 
example: There is reference to substance in the act of accepting or letting the outcome 
stand. This acceptance might than be “based on the quality of your deliberation”, which 
seems to bring it very close to a procedural view, but nevertheless omits to go all the way. 
According to this view, you might associate the idea of a substantive consensus with the idea 
of normative unanimity, that is, everybody coming to hold the same position for the same 
reasons. In much deliberative theory (Mansbridge, 2010: 66 + 68), it is thought that if a 
deliberative group cannot reach consensus in this sense, then the proper role of deliberation 
is simply to clarify and structure the disagreement, which sets the scene for a decision by 
some other (non-deliberative) method, usually a vote. Now what Beatty & Moore outline in 
the paper with the idea of joint acceptance and deliberative acceptance is a kind of 
consensus that is less than normative unanimity (in which scientists can speak as one 
without having to say that they were in full agreement), but more than simply the 
preferences of the participants combined under some decision rule, which need have no 
reference at all to substance.7 
 
                                                          
7
 We thank Alfred Moore for clearing this out. 
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Thus, the solution for the tension between plurality and consensus could be sought in some 
form of meta-consensus or meta-agreement. The resulting account of consensus will be a 
social one – not stipulating the characteristics the outcome should have, but stipulating the 
social procedure that has to be followed. Obviously, it is self-evident that an account of 
consensus is social. Consensus is always a product of sociality. However, we want to 
emphasize the parallel of our accounts with social accounts of objectivity8. Another intuitive 
way to grapple the difference is to imagine when one calls a certain decision democratic in 
contemporary political theory: this is not because the decision or outcome of the procedure 
has certain intrinsic characteristics that make it democratic, but because itself is the result of 
going through a democratic procedure. Shifting the focus from the product to the epistemic 
processes resulting in an outcome, also implies that consensus comes in degrees, depending 
on the extent to which the procedure has been followed, repeated, etc. 
 
The debate about scientific consensus then moves to consensus on epistemic procedures, 
i.e. finding a form of meta-consensus. Thus, the tension between scientific plurality and 
consensus is not tackled on the simple level, but on the meta-level. This is analogous to how 
democratic societies deal with value pluralism; the focus is not on getting rid of value 
pluralism, but on establishing a framework  - a meta-consensus - within which pluralism can 
be dealt with satisfactorily. The meta-consensus can be one that prescribes rational 
deliberation (in line with models of deliberative democracy), or aggregation (stipulating a 
procedure for adding up the available views), or agonistic pluralism (developing a procedure 
or constellation - conflictual consensus - that wants to optimize the epistemic fecundity via 
agonism, cf. [AUTHOR], 2009), etc. 
 
5. Consensus-making and the meta-consensus II: deliberative choreographies, aggregation 
and contestability. 
 
Let us now return to Solomon’s analysis of consensus conferences and the procedures at 
play. Solomon scrutinizes NIH Consensus Development Conferences, as it is a good example 
of a social, deliberative epistemic procedure.  
 
Advocates of rational deliberation as most desirable social epistemology have been claiming 
it reveals bias and presuppositions, corrects errors, generates additional evidence, and more 
can be accomplished through rational deliberation among two or more individuals than by 
individuals working alone. For some, for instance, Helen Longino (1990), this rational 
deliberation and critical interaction are constitutive of scientific objectivity, provided that 
the interaction respects some norms.9 The NIH consensus program also works hard to be 
perceived as objective (cf. Solomon, 2007: 174), although it may not actually achieve 
objectivity qua freedom from all bias:  
 
                                                          
8
 The most well-known example here is Helen Longino’s social account of objectivity (cf. Longino 1990, 2002). 
See also Douglas (2004) for a good analysis.  
9
 We do want to add, though, that for Longino objectivity comes in degrees and she does not consider the 
“closure” of controversy or critical interaction as the outcome to be obtained – plurality and dissent have their 
value. This is contrary to most consensus conferences where the “closure” of intellectual controversy and the 
establishment of a consensus is imperative. 
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“The consensus program ‘science court’ is not designed to be free of biases such as, for 
example, group dynamics, ordering of speakers, rhetorical force of speakers, peer 
pressure, chair style, general medical practice biases (e.g. intervention is generally 
favored over non-intervention), unsystematic evaluation of evidence, the effects of 
sleep deprivation and conservativeness or radicalism of panel members. The only 
biases it is designed to eliminate (and it may or may not succeed in doing so) are those 
of governmental pressures, commercial pressures and biases from one’s own prior 
research in the area.” (Solomon, 2007: 169) 
 
Here, Solomon emphasizes via her discussion of consensus conferences that rational 
deliberation does not deliver what it promises as it is subject to groupthink, suppression of 
dissent and other biases typical of deliberating groups (also see her 2006). Instead of the 
procedure of deliberation, Solomon wants to defend the procedure of aggregated judgment, 
in which members of a group typically do not deliberate with each other, but instead cast 
their votes or give their views independently. This might even make the NIH consensus 
conferences obsolete: “A more recent epistemic concern about the idea of consensus 
development is, wouldn’t it be quicker, more timely, and at least as good to do a meta-
analysis of the available evidence? Such a formal analysis would have a similar claim to be 
free from bias.” (Solomon, 2007: 169)1011 Should the conferences play an epistemic role at 
all, that is: “Consensus conferences seem to miss the intended window of epistemic 
opportunity: they typically take place after the experts reach consensus.” (Solomon, 2007: 
170) 
 
But, is the epistemic work done, if one limits the procedure to aggregation? Are we not 
losing epistemic adequacy and contestability (linked to epistemic responsibility) out of sight? 
Returning to the analytical distinction between an academic and an interface consensus, 
Solomon seems to presuppose that an aggregative procedure establishing academic 
consensus does all the epistemic work (and establishing an interface consensus could 
possibly be understood as doing merely policy work). However, the NIH conferences could 
perform epistemic functions that the aggregation neglects. 
 
a) epistemic adequacy 
 
In her analysis of NIH conferences, Solomon notices that: “The NIH consensus program has 
never been assessed for the accuracy of outcomes. No-one has ever investigated, for 
example, whether the outcomes are better – more ‘true’ or whatever – than those achieved 
by other methods such as non-neutral panels or formal meta-analysis of evidence.” 
(Solomon, 2007: 174) When she scrutinizes social deliberative epistemic procedures 
wondering whether they yield the desired kinds of products, she focuses on accuracy of 
outcomes, not on their adequacy. Adequacy seems to be an afterthought.  
                                                          
10
 A bit further in her paper Solomon correctly describes that meta-analysis of evidence has now been part of the 
NIH Consensus Conferences preparations. She thus asks whether there is still room for consensus conferences 
when meta-analyses have already been performed. What Solomon refers to here as meta-analysis is the 
systematic literature review prepared by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), which is a 
literature review that tries to identify, appraise, select, and synthesize all high quality research evidence relevant 
to a particular research question ([AUTHOR], 2012). 
11
 See also Sunstein (2006) for a development of this line of criticism, we will not engage with that here. 
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Let us briefly illustrate the difference between accuracy and adequacy that we have in mind 
here.  Speaking about (a) accuracy, we think of the relation with reality, preciseness of the 
answer given, while (b) adequacy points at what the explainee expects of an answer or how 
it fits with the explainee’s epistemic interests. To clarify these criteria and the idea that there 
often is a trade-off to be made between them, let us compare the answers given to the 
questions of a consensus conference with maps. A subway map like the one of the Paris 
Metro is adequate for its users because it accurately represents specific types of features 
(e.g. direct train connections between stations, number of stations between two given 
stations, …) while other features are consciously less accurately represented (the exact 
distances between the stations, the relative geographical orientation of the stations, …). If 
the latter would be represented more accurately, the map could become less adequate for 
its intended users and a perfectly accurate representation mirroring every detail would be 
utterly useless. Other maps (e.g. Paris’ shopping or tourist attractions maps) require other 
kinds of information (relating to, e.g., distances, details about street names, house numbers, 
etc.) in order to be useful – the best trade-off between accuracy and adequacy differs 
depending on the interests or desiderata at play. Thus, on the one hand, because of different 
interests or desiderata, it is impossible to make a map that is ideal in all possible situations. 
On the other hand, not all maps are equally good, as one can make claims of superiority that 
are bound to specific situations. The same can be said about the answers to the questions 
that are put central in a consensus conference. 
 
In Solomon’s understanding of what NIH conferences actually do, the accuracy of outcomes 
should not be a worry, given she claims that there is already an academic consensus before 
the conferences take place which seems to make the consensus conference itself obsolete 
from an epistemic point of view. She sees NIH conferences as the (interface) moment in 
which the wording or the articulation of this consensus is done in an adequate way (“user-
friendly”): “Second, formal meta-analysis of research, classified into grades of quality of 
research, is hardly user-friendly. The NIH consensus statement is written so as to be 
intelligible not only to primary health care practitioners but to health care administrations 
and the general public. NIH conferences are not only rhetorical forces; they make the 
research more widely accessible.” (Solomon, 2007: 175) However, this understanding of the 
relation between accuracy and adequacy, between the academic moment and the interface 
moment, is too uni-directional, as if adequacy concerns do not touch upon accuracy 
concerns. Adequacy concerns can be articulated in the interface moment, which then should 
be fed back into the academic moment in order to trade-off accuracy and adequacy 
concerns. In that sense the interface moment is not merely a moment of user-friendly 
dissemination, but also one of critique and contestability of the academic moment 
(highlighting epistemic interests that have not been addressed).  
 
Solomon defends her claim in relation to the NIH conferences, by drawing on two examples, 
i.e. the ‘Helicobacter Pylori in Peptic Ulcer Disease conference’ (1994) and the ‘Management 
of Hepatitis C Consensus Development Conference’ (2002). By analyzing both in detail, we 
can show how the interface moment does highlight epistemic interests that have not been 
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addressed at the academic moment and thus point at the epistemic role of the interface 
moment in terms of adequacy12: 
 
First, according to Solomon, “the 2002 Consensus Development Conference ‘Management of 
Hepatitis C’ repeats recommendations that were already stated by the FDA in the previous 
year” (Solomon, 2007: 170). The two 2001 studies dealing with hepatitis C issued by the 
Food and Drug Administration are: ‘FDA “Ribavirin and chronic hepatitis C infection”, 
consumer, 2001; 35(5): 3’ and ‘Schwetz B.A. From the FDA, JAMA, 2001: 286(10): 1166’. 
What both studies acknowledge is the fact that the FDA has issued two approvals involving 
the use of Rebetol capsules (ribavirin) to treat patients with chronic hepatitis C. Now if we 
look at the outline of the final NIH report, we notice that the report deals with the following 
five questions: (1) What is the natural history of hepatitis C?, (2) What is the most effective 
appropriate approach to diagnose and monitor patients?, (3) What is the most effective 
therapy for hepatitis C?, (4) Which patients with hepatitis C should be treated?, and (5) What 
recommendations can be made to patients to prevent transmission of hepatitis C? (NIH, 
2002: 7). In response to the question that comes closest to the one being answered by the 
FDA report, i.e. ‘What is the most effective therapy for hepatitis C?’, the NIH report says that 
“combination therapy results in better treatment responses than monotherapy, but the 
highest response rates have been achieved with pegylated interferon in combination with 
ribavirin. […] Currently the best indicator of effective treatment is an SVR, […]” (NIH, 2002: 
17). A crucial nuance is at stake here: whereas the FDA reports talk about an appropriate 
method of dealing with hepatitis C, namely taking ribavirin, the NIH report addresses the 
question what the best (or most effective) therapy for hepatitis C is. An FDA report does not 
address the question of most effective therapy, it merely “[…] requires drugs to be tested 
only relative to placebos. This means that an FDA approval is, at best, a signal that the 
approved drug is better than taking a sugar pill, not that it’s better than an existing 
treatment” (Reiss, 2010: 9). Moreover, the other types of questions the NIH report dealt 
with were not addressed in any of the FDA reports. Taken all together, the NIH report 
displays something more substantial than merely repeating FDA recommendations, it takes 
these recommendations to another level and incorporates them in a larger framework. 
Addressing the adequacy in this case, means answering the above 5 questions, a task the 
NIH consensus conference set out to do. The multitude of questions were not yet addressed 
                                                          
12
 As is stated on the NIH website, the consensus conference examples we refer to here serve merely an 
historical and epistemological purpose to defend claims on consensus formation. The actual statements 
referred to from within any of the reports should thus not be judged for their truth today: “This Archive of 
Older Conference Statements is provided solely for historical purposes. Due to the cumulative nature of 
medical research, new knowledge has inevitably accumulated in these subject areas in the time since these 
statements were prepared. Thus some of the material is likely to be out of date, and at worst simply wrong. 
The statements may, however, continue to be useful to the research community as a reference for 
understanding what was known about a topic at a particular point in time, including whether gaps in research 
identified at the time of each conference have since been filled. It is for this purpose that the conference 
statements will remain available in this format indefinitely. For reliable, current information on these and other 
health topics, we recommend consulting the National Institutes of Health's MedlinePlus 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ (NIH, website on the consensus development conference program)”. 
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in academic literature, nor the question what the best therapy might be13. Clearly an 
example of how epistemic interests surpass the academic moment. 
 
Second, according to Solomon, the ‘Helicobacter Pylori in Peptic Ulcer Disease conference’ 
(1994) “took place after the important clinical trials […] and after research scientists, and 
many prominent clinicians, had reached consensus on the use of antibiotics for peptic 
ulcers” (Solomon, 2007: 170). The NIH report reflects all the scientific studies that 
established a disturbing epidemiologic relationship between H. pylori and gastric 
malignancies, concluding that “such studies have given rise to the hypothesis that H. pylori is 
a major etiologic factor in peptic ulcer disease and that diagnosis and eradication of the 
organism are necessary for optimal therapy of the disorder” (NIH, 1994: 3-4). However, this 
is not the only matter this report investigated. Similar to the 2002 report mentioned above, 
this report brought together specialists in gastroenterology, surgery, infectious diseases, 
epidemiology, and pathology, as well as the public, to address multiple questions: (1) What 
is the causal relationship of H. pylori to upper gastrointestinal disease? (2) How does one 
diagnose and eradicate H. pylori infection? (3) Does eradication of H. pylori infection benefit 
the patient with peptic ulcer disease? (4) What is the relationship between H. pylori 
infection and gastric malignancy? (5) Which H. pylori-infected patients should be treated? (6) 
What are the most important questions that must be addressed by future research in H. 
pylori infections? After presentations by experts and discussion by the audience, the 
consensus panel weighed the evidence and prepared their consensus statement. Among 
their findings, the panel concluded that: (1) ulcer patients with H. pylori infection require 
treatment with antimicrobial agents in addition to antisecretory drugs whether on first 
presentation with the illness or on recurrence; (2) the value of treating nonulcer dyspepsia 
patients with H. pylori infection remains to be determined; and (3) the interesting 
relationship between H. pylori infection and gastric cancers requires further exploration 
(NIH, 1994: 3-4). Solomon’s claim that there was a pre-established consensus on the use of 
antibiotics for peptic ulcers, seems a bit to straightforward, as the answer to the fifth 
question warrants further research to be conducted, at least for some of the patients 
intended: There are ample data to support the antimicrobial eradication of H. pylori 
infection in patients with peptic ulcer disease. All patients with gastric or duodenal ulcers 
who are infected with H. pylori should be treated with anti-microbials regardless of whether 
they are suffering from the initial presentation of the disease or from a recurrence. H. pylori-
infected peptic ulcer patients who are receiving maintenance treatment with antisecretory 
agents or who have a history of complicated or refractory disease should also be treated for 
the infection. The presence of NSAID’s, including aspirin, as a contributing factor should not 
alter the antimicrobial regimen, but whenever possible, these drugs should be discontinued. 
However, in asymptomatic H. pylori-infected patients without ulcers, the data are not 
sufficient to support prophylactic antimicrobial therapy to prevent ulcer disease in the future 
to reduce the likelihood of developing gastric neoplasia. Also, no convincing data exists to 
support routine treatment of patients with nonulcer dyspepsia who are infected with H. 
pylori. Thus, at the present time there is no reason to consider routine detection or treatment 
of H. pylori infection in the absence of ulcers. Carefully controlled prospective studies are 
                                                          
13
 This is a critique that transcends this particular report, as most NIH consensus reports address a multitude of 
questions targeted at the needs and interests of the people (see also the NIH website on the consensus 
development program). 
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needed to assess the benefits of treating nonulcer dyspepsia patients with H. pylori infection. 
It is self-evident that no patient should be treated for H. pylori unless one of the sensitive and 
specific tests previously discussed demonstrates infection (NIH, 1994: 14, our italics).”  This 
answer suggests how for some cases definitive answers need to be postponed as long as 
prospective studies remain absent. Another example here, is how the question whether 
eradication of H. pylori infection prevents gastric cancer, can only directly be answered by 
use of a long and costly study, which was not present. The NIH report therefore suggests an 
alternative approach to conduct studies looking at the intermediate endpoints that are 
thought to predict the evolution of malignancy and their response to H. pylori eradication. 
Also, the report recommends that more epidemiological studies would be needed to define 
more precisely the subset of H. pylori-infected individuals who will develop gastric cancer 
(NIH, 1994: 17). Moreover, a causal relationship between H. pylori and peptic ulcer disease is 
more difficult to establish (as opposed to a causal relationship between H. pylori and chronic 
superficial gastritis) from the available data in part because of the lack of an animal model 
and because only a small proportion of individuals harboring the organism develop 
ulceration (NIH, 1994: 5). All of these are thus obstacles H. pylori research is confronted with 
in ascribing the correct use of antibiotics. Adequacy concerns, as mentioned above, can thus 
be articulated in the interface moment, in which participants can advance epistemic 
interests that have not been addressed, which then should be fed back into the academic 
moment in order to trade-off accuracy and adequacy concerns. In this case, a requirement 
for prospective studies, intermediate endpoint studies , epidemiological studies and animal 
models serve as a feedback loop, where the interface moment, by addressing the question 
of appropriate medication, gives advice on what research still needs to be conducted to be 
able to serve the needs of those infected14. In that sense the interface moment is not merely 
a moment of user-friendly dissemination, but also one of critique and contestability of the 
academic moment. 
 
Perhaps the easiest way to grasp the opportunity the NIH consensus conferences leave for 
adequacy is in how they value the evaluation of the patient as most central in their 
discourse. For instance, in the 2000 consensus conference on osteoporosis, it says that: “[…] 
until there is good evidence to support the cost-effectiveness of routine screening, or the 
                                                          
14
 In other cases, such as the NIH consensus conference on management of hepatitis B (2008), similar demands 
for further research as to be able to answer the question for treatment appropriately reemerge. The conclusion 
of this report goes as follows: “[…] Hepatitis B is a major cause of liver disease worldwide, ranking as a 
substantial cause of cirrhosis and hepatocellular carcinoma. The development and use of a vaccine for hepatitis 
B virus (HBV) has resulted in a substantial decline in the number of new cases of acute hepatitis B among 
children, adolescents, and adults in the United States. However, this success has not yet been duplicated 
worldwide, and both acute and chronic HBV infection continue to represent important global health problems. 
Seven treatments are currently approved for adult patients with chronic HBV infection in the United States: 
interferon-a, pegylated interferon-a, lamivudine, adefovir dipivoxil, entecavir, telbivudine, and tenofovir 
disoproxil fumarate. Interferon-a and lamivudine have been approved for children with HBV infection. 
Although available randomized, controlled trials (RCTs) show encouraging short-term results – demonstrating 
the favorable effect of these agents on such intermediate markers of disease as HBV DNA level, liver enzyme 
tests, and liver histology – limited rigorous evidence exists demonstrating the effect of these therapies on 
important long-term clinical outcomes, such as the development of hepatocellular carcinoma or a reduction in 
deaths. Questions therefore remain about which groups of patients benefit from therapy and at which point in 
the course of disease this therapy should be initiated (NIH, 2008: 4, our italics).” The NIH report here tries to 
meet these questions on patient treatment, that purely on the basis of scientific evidence (academic consensus 
in Solomon’s account), are left unaddressed.  
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efficacy of early initiation of preventive drugs, an individualized approach is recommended 
(NIH, 2000: 19).” Taking into account adequacy during consensus conferences will thus 
influence the content of the academic consensus – which makes the conference more than 
merely dissemination and choreography. 
 
b) contestability (and epistemic responsibility) 
 
Different epistemic interests to be addressed, and related trade-offs between accuracy and 
adequacy, might result in a variety of outcomes in which the idea of articulating thé scientific 
consensus becomes more nuanced. Adequacy concerns explicated during the interface 
moment put the plurality of epistemic interests up front. Interface assures contestability and 
raises questions about the degree of answerability/responsibility of the experts/scientists. 
Contestability - providing participants the possibility to challenge homogenization, 
marginalization of epistemic interests, etc. and diminish these tendencies – can be found 
both on the simple level of finding consensus as well as on the meta-level, i.e. the 
consensual setting in which the interaction takes place (and on which there is some form of 
meta-consensus).  
 
An aggregative procedure misses contestability, in the sense that, as Alison Wylie puts it: 
“[…] well functioning aggregation […] preserves systematic bias as faithfully as it preserves 
the information and empirically probative insights held by members of a group” (Wylie, 
2005: 46)15. Moreover, in many occasions, we lack the knowledge, means and time to assess 
whether the conclusions been put forth are the right ones. When we take one’s testimony 
for granted, we do this often purely based on trust. For this we must have good reasons to 
trust the other person, in other words, he or she must be deemed trustworthy (Hardwig, 
1991: 697-700). The question that springs to mind is whether we can expect of people to 
trust a judgment that was taken through aggregation, where the possibility exists that the 
group decision does not correspond with any individual opinion defended in the group. 
When, for instance, a group is polarized on an issue and the decision is but an average not 
defended by any of the people involved. A dubious policy that no one actually endorses, 
would thus be the result of a strongly divided group. Aggregative procedure taking is but a 
quasi-transparent process: when there is no opportunity for debate and no arguments are 
given in favor or against a certain take on things, it remains difficult for the general audience 
to acquire on which grounds a decision was taken ([AUTHOR], under review). This but 
obscures the opportunity for contestability, as part of the process remains in the dark for 
most of the people involved. An interface moment could allow for contestability as it offers 
opportunity both to (1) question bias, as well as, (2) acquire insight into how certain 
positions and decisions came to be. The NIH general procedure allows for both moments of 
contestability: Because they want to provide an independent look on the topic, they opt for 
a type of ‘court model’, instating an unbiased panel. The review-process itself is structured 
as follows: First, there is an in-depth presentation of evidence to the panel. This includes a 
                                                          
15
 As an example Wylie investigates research concerning prerequisites on gender. She mentions there being 
research in which professors were to judge a fictive candidate for a job on the basis of a resume. When the 
candidate was named Mark Miller, he was hired by two thirds of the professors. However, when the identical 
resume made mention of Karen Miller, the candidate was but hired by less than half of the professors (Wylie, 
2006: 46). 
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systematic literature review  prepared by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ). In addition, recognized experts on the topic give presentations to the panel and the 
audience. Finally, formal periods of public discussion are held. The conference program 
contains approximately 21 speakers: 3 of them present the information found in the 
systematic review of the literature; the other 18 are experts on the topic at hand, have likely 
published on the matter, and may have strong opinions or beliefs on the topic. Crucial here 
is that where multiple viewpoints on a topic exist, every effort is made to include speakers 
who address all sides of the issue (NIH, website). It is only but through the procedure that 
moments of contestability become possible. 
 
Examples of contestability concerning meta-consensus, i.e. the procedure, can be found, for 
instance, in relation to the NIH Consensus program, as we learn from Solomon’s analysis 
(2011: 244): “So we see particular concerns about “objectivity” of panel members, fairness 
of chairs, time pressure and late night sessions, balanced assessment of the evidence, and so 
forth. The NIH CDC Program has been evaluated on a number of occasions: internal review in 
1980, a University of Michigan Study in 1982, a Rand Corporation review in 1989 an IOM 
study in 1990, and most recently by a NIH working group in 1999 [Perry and Kalberer, 1980; 
Wortman et al., 1982; Kanouse et al., 1989; IOM, 1990a; Leshner et al., 1999] Concerns have 
regularly been expressed about panel selection to ensure ‘balance and objectivity,’ speaker 
selection that represents the range of work on the topic, representation of patient 
perspectives and more careful and systematic assessment of the quality and quantity of 
scientific evidence. Concerns have also been expressed about the time pressure to produce a 
statement in less than three days, and especially the lack of time for reflection or gathering 
of further information. Such concerns have in fact been behind some changes over time in 
the NIH CDC Program, and also behind the creation of different procedures at other kinds of 
consensus conferences, in both the national and the international scene.”  
 
Kristina Rolin (2009) stipulates the epistemic role outsiders to particular scientific 
communities can play. She argues that an epistemically responsible scientist has a duty to 
respond to outside criticism in certain circumstances insofar as it includes an appropriate 
challenge to her views. A meta-consensus taking contestability into account differs from 
both aggregated judgment – in supporting dynamical, diachronic interaction – and rational 
deliberation – avoiding groupthink via contestation. Obviously, contestability comes in 
degrees and is present to a greater or lesser extent in the existing formats for consensus-
making.  
 
Having pointed at the epistemic importance of considerations of adequacy and 
contestability, we can conclude that the role of the consensus conference is not merely 
choreographic or ‘just’ a matter of policy. We highlighted clear epistemic roles, both in 
explicating adequacy and in assuring contestability – it is an epistemic role which Solomon 
misses in her critique; “If the topic is not a scientific topic but is, instead, a matter of policy, 
the use of a consensus conference can be appropriate. The scientific community can 
tolerate— even celebrate — research disagreements. Policy decisions usually require the 
joint action of individuals, groups and nations. A well-negotiated consensus is widely thought 
of as the ideal foundation for joint action. So those European Consensus Conferences which 
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consider questions of policy are more appropriately designed to attain their goals than, for 
example, the NIH CDC Program.” (Solomon, 2011: 247-248) 
 
6. Modifying the public understanding of scientific consensus. 
 
Establishing scientific consensus is highly valued by philosophers16, scientists and the public. 
The emergence of a scientific consensus replacing competing accounts is often interpreted 
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 There are also other philosophers that have dealt with the value of pluralism and consensus. A similar 
example as to the way we dealt with both terms in this paper, is the recent work by Martin Carrier (2012). I 
here briefly present his account and how it relates to ours: According to Carrier, in addition to pluralism at the 
level of theories and value-commitments alike, scientific research is also characterized by a joint striving for 
consensus which he traces back to a shared epistemic attitude. This attitude manifests itself, e.g., in the 
willingness of scientists to subject their claims to empirical scrutiny and to respect rational argument. This 
shared epistemic attitude is embodied in rules adopted by the scientific community concerning general 
principles of dealing with knowledge claims. His contention is that pluralism and consensus formation can be 
brought into harmony by placing them at different levels of consideration: at the level of scientific reasoning 
and at the level of social conventions regarding how to deal with claims put forward within the scientific 
community. That is to say, the belligerent pluralism constitutive of essential parts of scientific rationality is 
curbed or pacified by a joint striving for consensus. Pluralism remains temporary and transient; it comes to an 
end eventually and gives way to consensus. (Carrier, 2012: 16) In particular, Carrier argues that we regularly 
observe that a period of strife and confrontation is followed by the emergence of a consensus. When the dust 
has settled, a convergence toward widely shared views obtains in the scientific community. Further, according 
to him, this consensus is achieved without external pressure. Some sort of internal mechanism appears to 
ensure that the plurality of contrasting and heterogeneous approaches gives way to a generally accepted state 
of research. But it remains to be clarified by which process the scientific community settles on a certain 
hypothesis or theory eventually. One option Carrier considers, is that the large majority of empirical 
achievements and epistemic values point in the same direction. That is, although values such as broad scope, 
coherence with background knowledge, and accuracy are conceptually distinct, it may happen that they all 
favor one particular account. Miriam Solomon subscribes to such a view, according to which consensus in 
science is rare and without epistemic significance . Consensus is generated by the fortuitous convergence of a 
variety of factors of a diverse nature, empirical or non-empirical, cognitive or emotional, rational or social. 
(Solomon, 2001: 11, 99-120) However, the eventual formation of a consensus is typical in science and 
distinctive of it. The repeated well-considered intellectual withdrawal that goes along with the emergence of a 
scientific consensus is a hallmark of scientific debates. Political and religious strife tends to continue indefinitely 
and is only stopped by the weariness of the fighting parties. Yet scientific controversies usually come to an end 
on substantive grounds. According to Carrier, this phenomenon of giving in deliberately is a characteristic of 
the scientific enterprise by which it distinguishes itself from other intellectual fields. (Carrier, 2012: 17-18) 
The epistemic attitude is, according to Carrier, codified in the form of procedural rules of the scientific 
community. The epistemic attitude does not address the process of assessing hypotheses directly; it rather 
concerns procedures for debating such assessments. This attitude finds its expression, in particular, in 
commitments like attending to dissenting views and empirical problems, taking up criticism, and granting 
intellectual authority on substantive grounds alone . Further, these rules are essentially social: they address 
how to deal with nonconformist understandings and opposing approaches. Such procedural rules for 
addressing substantive diversity are suitable for constraining antagonistic beliefs and to drive them toward a 
common position. Keep in mind that they are also epistemic in that following their advice is conducive to 
reliability or truth, that is, epistemic goals of science. (Carrier, 2012: 19) Such procedural rules are intertwined 
with values, but values of a different sort, namely social values of the scientific community. These rules address 
how to deal with dissenting views and opposing approaches and display a clear epistemic bearing. They are 
epistemic values of a particular sort. Such social values of the scientific community can be expected to be more 
stable than the prevalent epistemic commitments. The latter values may change as a result of interacting with 
nature and of attempting to cut nature at the joints. Yet the former values distinguish preferred patterns of 
social interaction in examining knowledge claims and thus remain unaffected by changes in the demands of 
what a good explanation or an excellent theory ought to accomplish. (Carrier, 2012: 17) Carrier, in his analysis, 
clearly focuses on academic consensus and omits to see the comparison to interface consensus. According to 
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as a proof of scientific progress and a marker of truth; ideally all scientific inquiry and debate 
would result in a consensus. Finding scientific consensus is then understood as a proof for 
the validity of a theory and – indirectly – of the public policy based on the consensus theory.  
 
The back side of the coin is that the lack of scientific consensus often is used to undermine 
or criticize science and the public policy based on it (e.g., former US President Bush on 
climate change). When scientists agree, their results are taken more seriously than when 
they disagree, even though such an agreement or consensus might hinder scientific progress 
because of critical, heterodox theories not being taken seriously (e.g., the theory of 
continental drift was accepted by geologists only after 50 years of rejection, and the theory 
of helicobacter pylori as the cause of stomach ulcers, was at first widely rejected by the 
medical community).  
 
These observations might question scientific consensus as an ideal or as the goal of inquiry 
and marker of truth; enforcing ‘consensus’ might be dangerous or not desirable, hence the 
importance of scrutinizing carefully what is actually going on in establishing scientific 
consensus; i.e. which moments one can distinguish, the epistemic and non-epistemic value 
of those moments as well as the different procedural set-ups – just like we have been doing 
above in distinguishing the academic, interface and meta-consensus. Communicating this 
variety of formats to the public, helps qualifying the actual span of scientific consensus 
making and the oracle like features it might sometimes have. Our reasoning is in line with 
Inmaculada de Melo-Martin and Kristen Intemann’s recent paper, where they show, by 
analyzing conflicts on GMO’s and climate change, that ‘focusing on dissent as a problematic 
activity sends the message to policy-makers and the public that any dissent undermines 
scientific knowledge.’ (de Melo-Martin & Intemann, 2013: 232-233) Encouraging and 
providing mechanisms of dissent can also be important to reassuring the public that the 
consensus view has undergone rigorous scrutiny. Events such as “climate-gate” reinforce the 
public perception that climate scientists are resistant to criticism and have a “bunker 
mentality” (Grundman, 2012). 
 
Pointing at some of the undesirable effects too high expectations about consensus-making 
might have, we refer to Churchill's famous dictum: "Democracy is the worst form of 
government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time." (from 
a House of Commons speech on Nov. 11, 1947). Similarly, science and consensus-making 
mechanisms create fallible knowledge.  
 
These insights taken together do not foreclose scientific consensus-making, but stress the 
need for a mentality change in society about what scientific research consists of and what it 
can entail for policy making. As such, ““in a scientific community, different individuals can 
weigh evidence in different manners through the use of different standards. In the best 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
him, the epistemic attitude is an attitude that differentiates the scientific community from the broader society, 
as science allows to eventually reach consensus on any given topic. However, as we have shown above, 
persistent disagreement is also a characteristic of science and not merely of science policy. Moreover, Carrier 
endorses Solomon’s view on consensus conferences, of scientific consensus being rare and without epistemic 
significance, which we refuted in the previous section of this chapter. Although Carrier manages to pinpoint the 
benefit of a procedural account, he omits to see how a procedural account of consensus can be opened up to 
include policy science. 
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case17, science puts forward a robust consensus based on a research process that allows 
continued scrutiny, re-examination, and revision.”(Oreskes, 2004: 369-370)18 
 
7. Conclusions  
 
Through our analysis we have argued in favor of the following claims: 
 
a) Consensus-making as discussed by philosophers of science, should be aware of the 
difference in aiming for an academic consensus or an interface consensus in science and 
society. A broader understanding of the different structures and functions of consensus-
making helps us to see more nuances. 
b) The difficulties of achieving consensus understood as an unanimous outcome – a 
seldom-attained ideal stipulated by a range of criteria – should make us shift to a 
procedural approach in which the emphasis is not so much on establishing the 
consensus, but dealing with plurality in a consensual way, i.e., framed within a meta-
consensus that agrees on how to disagree. 
c) Taking into account epistemic adequacy and contestability as important characteristics 
of sound epistemic processes, we questioned Solomon’s account of consensus 
conferences as just being moments of deliberative choreographies, repeating work that 
has already been done by the aggregation of expert opinions.  
d) Solomon’s idea of (what is the valuable) scientific consensus as, basically, an idea of 
academic consensus as we described it, holds on to an ideal which we also encounter 
among the public in general. According to us, it is too high an ideal, that eventually can 
be used against science; it is therefore more recommendable to think in terms of 
degrees of consensus and in adequacy for the public addressed while keeping an eye on 
the variety of consensus-making formats. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17
 A sentiment shared by other researchers: “The idea of consensus in science does not imply the fact that all 
the scientists have internalized and agreed upon the truth of the statements that make up a certain consensus. 
In this sense, what is called a ‘scientific consensus’ in the literature can be the product of compromise, 
negotiation, and only under special circumstances a truly consensual resolution” (Martini, 2011: 152). 
18
 This quote can read, as Miller would probably do, saying that this is not always the case, still thinking that 
only consensus that has certain properties should be trusted. (based on personal communication with Boaz 
Miller) However, we read “in the best case” as pointing out the fact that in many cases no robust consensus 
will be found, but nevertheless consensus seeking might be optimalized to (1) acquire the best result possible, 
(2) prevent forced consensus being established, and (3) allow trust to be generated. 
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